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Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma is a simple model for the interaction between two
self-interested agents who can choose whether or not to cooperate with one an-
other. Many real-world problems can be characterized in terms of the Iterated
Prisoner’s Dilemma, from the militarization of rival nations to the tradeoff be-
tween gas mileage and safety when purchasing a vehicle. The game theoretic prop-
erties of Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma are well understood, and previous research
by Robert Axelrod into the performance of various strategies in a Darwinian envi-
ronment is extensive. In this paper we extend Axelrod’s work by investigating the
dynamics of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma when multiple “communities,” each
playing its own Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma tournament, are allowed to interact
and influence each other. Specifically, we examine the case when these communities
are populated by players using two specific strategies: tit-for-tat and always-
noncooperative. We begin with rigorous analysis of the underlying structure of
the model in order to determine the conditions under which one of the two player
types faces extinction. We then demonstrate that cooperative equilibria do exist,




The mathematical game of Prisoner’s Dilemma is often used as a simple model of
scenarios in which two independent, self-interested agents must choose whether or not
to cooperate with each other. While mutual cooperation is more beneficial than mutual
noncooperation, asymmetric decisions yield an even greater benefit to one agent (and
a correspondingly poor result for the other). As its name implies, the logical stucture
of the game is illustrated by the story of a prisoner. The prisoner and his partner
in crime are arrested and immediately separated for individual questioning. Although
the authorities believe that the prisoners are guilty of a serious offense, there is only
sufficient evidence to convict them of a lesser crime. For this reason, the authorities
offer Prisoner A a deal: if he confesses to the serious offense and provides evidence that
leads to the conviction of Prisoner B, he will receive a sentence of only probation, but
Prisoner B will face significant jail time. Naturally, Prisoner B receives the same offer.
In the case that both prisoners confess, the offer is considered void, but because their
confessions have saved the authorities the time and money needed for prosecution, both
prisoners will receive a reduced sentence. Implicit, but unspoken to the prisoners is
the fact that if neither accepts the offer, they will both be convicted of the lesser crime
and will face time behind bars, but not as much as if they had been convicted of the
more serious offense.
If Prisoner A chooses to confess, then the self-interested Prisoner B is better off
confessing as well in order to reduce his own sentence. If Prisoner A remains silent, it
is still in the best interest of Prisoner B to confess to ensure that he receives no jail
time. Prisoner A sees the same logic, and so both are led to confess even though they
would have been better off if they had both chosen to remain silent.
Scenarios with a similar logical structure exist in a wide variety of contexts. For
instance, Snyder [6] analyzes elements of international relations in light of the Prisoner’s
Dilemma, leading to the formalization of the “security dilemma,” a phenomenon seen
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in militarization, disarmament, alliances, and colonization. We consider the specific
case of militiarization between rival nations that are at peace but wary of one another.
Either by treaty or unspoken cooperation, each maintains a predictable level of arms.
If one of these countries chooses to be “noncooperative” by fortifying its military, and
can do so quickly enough to develop first-strike capability, it can dictate terms to the
other. This leads both countries to mutual noncooperation, and so both move to build
up arms, which results in a significant loss of capital but not better security.
Consumers face a similar kind of “arms race” when deciding what kind of vehicle
to purchase. As White [7] explains, families see larger vehicles as providing more
protection in collisions, especially in cases where one vehicle (e.g., an SUV) has a
higher profile than another (e.g., a compact car). If all families purchase small vehicles,
all would be equally safe. If all families purchase larger vehicles instead, all are still
equally safe, but they incur the added cost of reduced fuel efficiency. However, if most
families purchase small vehicles, a single family can act in a “noncooperative” fashion
and choose to buy a large vehicle, and that family is very safe while others are less so
due to their “cooperative” choice.
The logical structure of such scenarios is encapsulated in the mathematical game
of Prisoner’s Dilemma. In this game, players earn points based on both their decision
and that of their opponents. As previously seen, the context of the game will dictate
what choices each player can make, but in general we abstract the decision to either
“cooperation” or “noncooperation”. We assume that the structure of the game is known
to both players, that the players do not communicate except to reveal their decisions,
and that the players are concerned only with maximizing their own score, or payoff.
The payoff parameters for a particular game are often gathered in a payoff matrix such
as
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Choice of Player A
C 6, 6 3, 7
N 7, 3 4, 4
C N
Choice of Player B
in which C indicates the choice of cooperation, N indicates the choice of noncoop-
eration, and the ordered pair in each cell has the form (Payoff to Player A, Payoff to
Player B). Given this particular matrix, both players receive a payoff of 6 if both choose
to cooperate, but Player A receives 7 points if he chooses noncooperation when Player
B chooses to cooperate. More generally, the payoff matrix for Prisoner’s Dilemma has
the form
Choice of Player A
C R, R S, T
N T, S P, P
C N
Choice of Player B
where T > R > P > S. This string of inequalities is what defines the structure of
Prisoner’s Dilemma. Relaxing the inequalities or switching values effectively leads to
the creation of a different game with an inherently different structure. The values are
labeled according to their significance: R is the reward for mutual cooperation, P is the
penalty for mutual noncooperation, T is the temptation to choose noncooperation, and
S is the sucker’s payoff, where the “sucker” is taken to be the player who is “tricked”
into cooperating so that the opponent can reap significant benefit. These values are
often taken to be positive, but the logical structure of the game only depends on the
string of inequalities above. For the sake of discussion, suppose that Player B chooses
to cooperate. Then Player A has a payoff of R if he cooperates, and a payoff of T
otherwise. Since T > R, the self-interested Player A should choose noncooperation.
Similarly, if Player B chooses noncooperation, the fact that P > S leads Player A to do
the same. In the language of mathematical game theory, noncooperation is said to be a
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dominant strategy for Player A, meaning that Player A earns more points by choosing
noncooperation regardless of the strategy employed by Player B. The same is true for
Player B. Were both players to cooperate, each would earn the next-to-best number
of points, but the dominant strategy of noncooperation leads self-interested players to
make choices that result in earning the next-to-worst number of points instead.
The possibility of multiple interactions between the same players changes the
situation. In this case, commonly called the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), a
game between two players can consist of more than one turn, and players can keep a
running record of the choices made in previous turns of a game and change their strategy
accordingly. For the purposes of this paper, we will consider an IPD tournament that
hosts a large number of players and consists of three nested levels of interaction: a
turn is a single choice made by each player in the context of the Prisoner’s Dilemma, a
game consists of multiple turns one after the other, and a round is made up of all the
games played amongst all players in the population. The tournament can consist of
multiple rounds in which unsuccessful strategies are “eliminated” after each iteration.
Loosely interpreted in a sociobiological sense, each round of the IPD tournament can
be understood as a generation, each game between players as a relationship, and each
turn of a game as a single interaction.
In the early 1980s, Axelrod reported experiments in which computer algorithms
implemented the decision strategies submitted by experts in economics, psychology,
sociology, political science, and mathematics (see [1], [2], and [3]). In the first round of
this tournament, each of the 14 algorithms played a game of IPD against every other
algorithm. At the conclusion of the round, algorithms that performed well according
to certain measures were duplicated while those that did poorly were eliminated from
the tournament. The procedure was repeated in subsequent rounds, and Axelrod kept
track of the population demographics. One particular strategy, developed by Anatol
Rapoport and called tit-for-tat, emerged as being particularly successful. The rules
governing this strategy are surprisingly simple: (1) begin each game of IPD by coop-
4
erating, and (2) in each subsequent turn of the game, do what the opponent did in the
previous turn. Thus when two tit-for-tat players meet, they begin by cooperating
and do so for all rounds thereafter.
A simple mathematical analysis of the structure of IPD sheds light on why the
tit-for-tat strategy is so effective. Let us suppose that the number of turns in a
game of IPD is random, and that w is the probability that the next turn will take place
(we take w to be a parameter of the tournament, not a specific game). Because future
turns of a game might not happen, points earned in the current round have more value
than potential points from future turns. This leads us to discount future payoffs by
the probability that they will occur; the cumulative total of these weighted payoffs is
the present value of the game, denoted by V (S1,S2) where S1 is the player’s strategy
and S2 is the opponent’s strategy. For example, the present value of a game of IPD
between two tit-for-tat players is




since both players begin by cooperating and thus cooperate for every round there-
after. Similarly, the present value of a game between two players who always choose
noncooperation, which we denote by mean , is




since both mean players will only ever choose noncooperation. When tit-for-tat
and mean players meet, the present value of the game to the tit-for-tat player is




and the present value to the mean player is




These two present values differ only by the score in the first round since a tit-for-tat
player will mimic the mean player after the initial loss. For the sake of discussion,
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let us suppose that the population of algorithms are of only these two types, and that
x ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of the population that plays tit-for-tat . Then a tit-for-
tat player in a round-robin tournament should expect the value of a game to be, on
average,
ET(x) = xV (tft,tft) + (1− x)V (tft,mean), (1)
and mean players should expect to score, on average,
EM(x) = xV (mean,tft) + (1− x)V (mean,mean) (2)
points per game. Axelrod’s tournament was designed to encourage a Darwinian process
of selection in order to determine the best strategy: successful strategies experienced
significant growth while unsuccessful strategies became extinct. In an evolutionary
setting such as Axelrod’s tournament, we expect the population of tit-for-tat players
to grow relative to the population of mean players when ET(x) > EM(x), vice versa
when EM(x) > ET(x), and we expect demographic equilibrium when ET(x) = EM(x).
By substituting the appropriate values of V (S1,S2) into equations (1) and (2), we see
that ET(x) = EM(x) if and only if
























Multiplying both sides by (1−w) and collecting all terms containing x on the left-hand
side, we have that
[
P − S +R− T + (S + T − 2P )w
]
x = (P − S)(1− w). (3)
This relationship between x and w is depicted as a curve in the xw−plane in Figure
1. The point Q in the figure represents a situation in which tit-for-tat players are
more numerous than needed to balance the first-turn losses to players that employ the
mean stratefy, so ET(x) > EM(x). Consequently, the tit-for-tat population should
experience larger growth than the mean population, so we expect x to increase from one
round of the tournament to the next and the point Q will move right along a horizontal
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line. Similarly, the point Y represents a scenario in which there are fewer tit-for-tat
players than needed for equilibrium. In this case, we expect the demographics to shift
in favor of the mean players from one round to the next, so the point Y will move
left along a horizontal line until the tit-for-tat player type is eliminated from the
tournament. In the language of evolutionary game theory, the tit-for-tat “species”
is driven to extinction over time if the population fraction x is too small relative to
the parameter w. Let us also note that Figure 1 shows no x at which ET(x) = EM(x)
when w is small. This happens because the average length of a game, 1/1−w, must be
sufficiently large in order for the benefits of mutual cooperation between tit-for-tat








Figure 1: The graph of equation (3) when T = 11, R = 7, P = 3, S = 1 where w is the
probability of continuing play in a game of IPD and x is the tit-for-tat population
in the tournament. Y is the case when the tit-for-tat population goes extinct and
Q is the case when tit-for-tat players eventually dominate the tournament.
In the work that follows, we will consider an IPD tournament in which T = 7,
R = 6, P = 4, and S = 3. With these parameters, we can use equation (3) to determine
the fraction of tit-for-tat players required for evolutionary stability in the single site,
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henceforth denoted by λ, as
[P − S +R− T + (S + T − 2P )w]λ = (P − S)(1− w)
[4− 3 + 6− 7 + (3 + 7− 2(4))w]λ = (4− 3)(1− w)





Thus by definition, ET(λ) = EM(λ). It will often be more convenient to treat λ as a
parameter for the system rather than w, and so we invert this function to determine w





Note that λ = 0.5 when w = 0.5, and 0 < λ < 1 only when w > 1/3. This says that
there exists an equilibrium only if the games are sufficiently long, which is exactly the
conclusion taken from Figure 1.
Axelrod extended his simulations to scenarios in which a population is not well-
mixed in order to study the territorial stability of strategies. In these scenarios, indi-
viduals are distributed across a lattice, and interact only with neighbors. Nakamaru
et al. [4] found that tit-for-tat players form tight clusters in the one-dimensional
lattice and that these clusters can spread when w is sufficiently large. In related work,
Oliphant [5] demonstrated that the spatial organization of player types on a spatial
lattice can have a significant effect on the evolution of a population.
In this paper we consider a modification of the lattice model in which vertices on
the lattice represent distinct but interacting communities. Each community is well-
mixed, the interaction between individuals is modeled with IPD, and the state of each
node is a continuous variable in [0, 1] that indicates the fraction of its population that
plays the tit-for-tat strategy. More specifically, we examine three such communities,
or sites, that are situated along a “road”, and in each round of the tournament some
fraction of the population from each site can travel to tournaments in neighboring sites.
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The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. In section 2 we construct a
replicator dynamic for population growth in the model and establish initial conditions
for the multi-site tournament. We then use simulations to show that given these initial
conditions the population of initially neutral sites can be driven fully to either player
type in the long-term limit. In sections 3 and 4 we establish the underlying math-
ematical structure of the game and prove a number of facts regarding the governing
equations of the system. In sections 5 and 6 we prove that one player type or the
other is driven to extinction given certain conditions on the parameters of the IPD
tournament. In section 7 we analyze the existence and stability of nontrivial equilibria
in which the demographics of the central population stabilizes, but neither player type
is driven to extinction. Finally, in section 8 we use numerical simulations in order to
estimate the value of the nontrivial equilibrium and its dependence on the fraction of
players who travel from their home site.
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2 Mathematical Representation
In this section we develop a mathematical model of an IPD tournament with a focus
on the growth of opposing populations over time. This evolutionary mechanism will
update both the tit-for-tat and mean populations based on their relative success
as measured by the expected value of a round. We begin by constructing a replicator
dynamic for the single-site tournament and then extend this idea to the multi-site
tournament. We conclude with simulations of the multi-site model that demonstrate
how either player type can dominate initially neutral sites in the long-term limit. As
seen in Section 1, we will assume that the payoff matrix is fixed with T = 7, R = 6,
P = 4, and S = 3.
2.1 The Single-Site Model
In the case of a single site, we denote by xn the fraction of the population in round n
that plays the tit-for-tat strategy, and by yn the complementary fraction of mean
players. Since there are only these two types of players in the tournament,
1 = xn + yn for all n. (6)
The evolutionary mechanism in our model is based on the following principle: if one
population does twice as well as the other, it experiences twice the relative growth as























(xn+1)(yn)EM = (1− xn+1)(xn)ET





The complimentary fraction of mean players is




Equation (8) allows us to formulate the increment in the tit-for-tat population from
round n to round n+ 1, which we will denote by ∆(xn), as
∆(xn) = xn+1 − xn
=
xnET
xnET + (1− xn)EM
− xn.
We can substitute the expressions for ET(xn) and EM(xn) into the increment as defined























(3xn + 3 + w − wxn). (9)























(3xn − 3wxn + 4). (10)
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We can now substitute these results into the increment ∆(xn). Note that the factor
of 11−w in the formulas for both ET and EM will cancel once substituted into ∆(x). It
is also helpful to note that the incremement does not depend on the round number, so
we can replace xn with x for simplicity. We write the increment as
∆(x) =
x(3x+ 3 + w − wx)
x(3x+ 3 + w − wx) + (1− x)(3x− 3wx+ 4)
− x
=
(x− x2)(3x+ 3 + w − wx)− x(1− x)(3x− 3wx+ 4)
x(3x+ 3 + w − wx) + (1− x)(3x− 3wx+ 4)
.
Factoring the numerator and simplifying the denominator, we have
∆(x) =
x(1− x)(2wx+ w − 1)
2w(x− 1)x+ 2x+ 4
.







2wx(x− 1) + 2x+ 4
=
2wx(1− x)(x− λ)
2wx(x− 1) + 2x+ 4
. (11)
Note that this function is zero at x = 0, x = 1, and x = λ. Further, since w ∈ [0, 1],
2w(x− 1)x+ 2x+ 4 = 2x(w(x− 1) + 1) + 4
= 2x((1− w) + wx) + 4 > 0.
hence the polarity of the increment is determined solely by the factor (x − λ) in the
numerator. A typical graph of ∆(x) is show in Figure 2, which demonstrates that
∆(xn) > 0 only when xn ∈ (λ, 1). In the lemma below we prove that the sequence
{xn} is increasing and bounded above and that xn → 1 as n→∞ provided x1 ∈ (λ, 1].
Lemma 1. Suppose x1 ∈ (λ, 1] in the single-site scenario, and xn+1 = xn + ∆(xn) as
stated previously. Then xn → 1 as n→∞. Similarly, xn → 0 as n→∞ if x1 ∈ [0, λ)







Figure 2: A typical graph of ∆(x), here with λ = 1/3.
Proof. First, suppose that x1 = 1. We know that ∆(1) = 0, hence xn+1 = xn = 1 for
all n ≥ 1.
Now let x1 ∈ (λ, 1). We can determine the value of xn for subsequent rounds
using equation (8), and since the denominator in equation (11) is clearly greater than
the numerator, it follows that xn ≤ 1 for all n ∈ N. Since x1 ∈ (λ, 1), we have that
x1−λ > 0, and so equation (11) tells us that ∆(x1) > 0. Since x2 > λ, we can reapply
this argument, and so for all n ∈ N, xn+1 > xn. Hence the sequence {xn} is increasing
and bounded above by 1, so it must converge to some value L in (λ, 1]. Using the
properties of limits,




















The only root of the function ∆(x) on the interval (λ, 1] is x = 1, hence L = 1.
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We now wish to consider the case when x1 ∈ [0, λ). Again, if x1 = 0, we have that
∆(0) = 0, and so xn+1 = xn = 0 for all n ∈ N.
Suppose x1 ∈ (0, λ). We again use equation (8) to establish that xn+1 > 0
and equation (11) to determine that ∆(xn) < 0 for all n ∈ N, so xn+1 < xn for all
rounds. Hence the sequence {xn} is decreasing and bounded below, so it must converge.
Further, as seen above,







The only root of ∆(x) on the interval [0, λ) is x = 0, therefore L = 0 in this case.
2.2 The Three-Site Model
Now we adapt the single-site model to the case of three sites of equal population,
say A, B, and C, that are distributed along a “road.” The fractions of tit-for-tat
players at these sites in round n of the tournament are an, bn, and cn, respectively.
Although each site holds its own IPD tournament, we assume that some fraction of
the players from each site, say q ∈ (0, 1), also interact with players from neighboring
sites at intermediate “trading posts” (see Figure 3). Further, we assume that neither
player type is more likely to travel than the other, so that q is both the fraction of













Figure 3: Schematic for player travel in the three-site line, where q is 1/2.
In order to demonstrate the effect of the trading posts, let us partition the residents
of Site A into two cohorts: those who travel to the trading post, and those who do not.
Individuals in the latter cohort play games of IPD only with other residents of Site A,
14
so the expected value of a game to players in this cohort is either ET(an) or EM(an),
according to which strategy they employ. Individuals in the other cohort encounter
both the players from their own site and some number from Site B, thus the adjusted





















In order to quantify the overall “success” of tit-for-tat players from Site A, we
combine the two cohorts with a weighted average according to the fraction of the tit-






+ (1− q)ET(an). (12)
Recall from equation (1) that
ET(x) = xV (tft,tft) + (1− x)V (tft,mean)
=
(
V (tft,tft)− V (tft,mean)
)
x+ V (tft,mean),
which we write as
ET = mx+ b
with m = V (tft,tft) − V (tft,mean) and b = V (tft,mean). Thus for any values
x and y,
EAT = qET(x) + (1− q)ET(y)
= q(mx+ b) + (1− q)(my + b)











and y = an,

























Whereas the players in Sites A and C have only one direction of travel, players in Site
B have two, hence there are four possible behaviors: no travel, travel to one site (either
A or C), or travel to both sites. The table below lists the probability of each behavior
and the associated fractions of tit-for-tat players encountered.
Behavior Probability TIT-FOR-TAT Fraction
Travel to neither A nor C (1− q)2 bn
Travel only to Site A q(1− q) bn+q an1+q
Travel only to Site C q(1− q) bn+q cn1+q
Travel to both A and C q2 q an+bn+q cn1+2q
As before, we determine the overall success for players in Site B by considering a
weighted average of the expected scores for each cohort of players.
















Using a similar strategy as seen with the derivation for EAT , we consider a general








where N is a positive integer and all xi are positive real numbers. Since ET(x) has the


























It is clear to see that
(1− q)2 + 2q(1− q) + q2 = 1,
so the expected score in Site B can be written as
EBT = ET
(
(1− q)2bn + q(1− q)
(









Hence we define the effective population for Site B to be
pB = (1− q)2bn + q(1− q)
(









































Since Sites A and C are symmetric in their formulation for effective populations,
pC =
(









A similar derivation for pB allows us to rewrite the effective population as
pB =
(
q2 + 2q3 − q4




1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4




q2 + 2q3 − q4
1 + 3q + 2q2
)
cn. (15)
Since q ∈ (0, 1), these coefficients are all positive and sum to 1. These forms for the
expected values pA, pB, and pC are useful as they demonstrate that the effective pop-
ulations are simply weighted averages of the three tit-for-tat population fractions:
an, bn, and cn.
Here we notice that this population mixing will change the pool of opponents that
a particular player expects to meet compared to the single-site scenario, and this in
turn affects the expected value of a game to that player. For this reason, we reconsider
equations (1) and (2) for Sites A, B, and C, and take x = pA, pB, or pC repectively.
The resulting values of ET and EM are then used to update each site’s tit-for-tat
population using equations (6) and (7); however, because the players do not migrate
from one site to another, the resident population, denoted by xn in equations (6) and
(7), is instead replaced with an, bn, or cn as appropriate. We can use these equations
to construct a multi-site analog of the single-site increment which we will denote by Ij
where j ∈ { A, B, C }. We will demonstrate this process for Site A, but the derivation
is equivalent for the other two sites.
As with the single-site increment, the increment for Site A is defined as
IA = an+1 − an
=
anEAT
anEAT + (1− an)EAM
− an.
The values of EAT and EAM are determined by equations (9) and (10) when x = pA, thus






(3pA + 3 + w − wpA)
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and






(3pA − 3wpA + 4).
We now substitute these results into the formulation for the increment. As in our
previous work, we note that the increment does not depend on the round number, so
we will replace an with just a:
IA =
a(3pA + 3 + w − wpA)
a(3pA + 3 + w − wpA) + (1− a)(3pA − 3wpA + 4)
− a
=
a(1− a)(2wpA + w − 1)
2wpAa+ 4 + (1− w)(3pA − a)
.
Using the identity between w and λ from equation (4), we rewrite this as
IA =
2wx(1− x)(pA − λ)
2w(pAx+
2
w + λ(3pA − x))
=
x(1− x)(pA − λ)
pAx+ 2 + 4λ+ λ(3pA − x)
.
The increments for Sites B and C have the same form and can be obtained by replacing
a and pA appropriately. We will often consider the increment for a general site j, with
j ∈ { A, B, C }, as
Ij(x) =
x(1− x)(p− λ)
px+ 2 + 4λ+ λ(3p− x)
. (16)
The main difference between the single-site and multi-site increment is that there is
now a root at p = λ rather than x = λ, and the polarity depends on the factor of
(p− λ) in the numerator.
2.3 Three-Site Simulations
Simulations allow us to observe the effect of Sites A and C on the demographics of
the central community, Site B. For several values of the single-site equilibrium, λ, we
initialize Site B with a tit-for-tat population of exactly λ. This population of tit-
for-tat players is said to have a growth potential of 1− λ, and the initial population
19
in Site A is biased in favor of tit-for-tat players by some fraction of the growth
potential. The population in Site C is biased in favor of the mean strategy by the
same fraction of the mean growth potential, which is λ. Thus we begin with
a1 = λ+ ε(1− λ)
b1 = λ (17)
c1 = λ− ελ
where ε is a small positive constant. Figure 4 shows results for λ ∈ {0.5, 0.43}, ε =
0.1, and q = 0.5. These simulations indicate that the single-site equilibrium, λ, is
not necessarily an equilibrium in the multi-site scenario, and either player type can
dominate Site B in the long run.
20
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Site A Site B Site C
Figure 4: Simulations of the 3-Site Line after 200 Rounds; (left) λ = 0.43; (right)
λ = 0.5.
Having established that the behavior of the middle site tit-for-tat population is
not as trivial as the single-site analogue, we wish to determine how the long-term
behavior of this demongraphic changes with respect λ. These figures indicate that
for some smaller value of λ (λ = 0.43), the tit-for-tat population is able to thrive,
and symmetrically, for some larger value of λ (λ = 0.5), the tit-for-tat population
diminshes over time. This leads us to the main investigation of this thesis: for which
values of λ do tit-for-tat players dominate the middle site, for which values do mean
players dominate, and are there values in between where the two player types coexist?
21
3 The Ordering Lemma
An important fact in the analysis of the three-site model is that an > bn > cn for all
n > 1 if a1 > b1 > c1. This fact, which we call the Ordering Lemma, is established by
considering the derivatives of the increment function and its close relative
Ij(x,w, p) =
x(1− x)(2wp+ w − 1)
2wpx+ 4 + (1− w)(3p− x)
. (18)
Note that whereas I is written as a function of only x in equation (16) because p depends
on x in the context of the tournament and w is a parameter of the tournament, here
we are treating p and w as independent variables.
Lemma 2. Suppose that x, w, and p are positive numbers less than 1. Then the partial
derivative of Ij(x,w, p) with respect to p is positive.




2wx(1− x)(2wpx+ 4 + (1− w)(3p− x))(
2wpx+ 4 + (1− w)(3p− x)
)2
− x(1− x)(2wp+ w − 1)(2wx+ 3(1− w))(
2wpx+ 4 + (1− w)(3p− x)
)2
=
2wx(1− x)− Ij(x,w, p)(2wx+ 3(1− w))
2wpx+ 4 + (1− w)(3p− x)
=
2wx+ 3(1− w)






The numerator of the leading factor is clearly positive since w and x are both in (0, 1),
and we have shown previously that the expression in the denominator is also positive,
hence the leading factor is positive. By using the formula for Ij(x,w, p), we find that




− x(1− x)(2wp+ w − 1)
2wpx+ 4 + (1− w)(3p− x)
.
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Multiplying by the positive common denominator and dividing by the positive factor
of x(1− x), we have
0 < 2w(2wpx+ 4 + (1− w)(3p− x))− (2wp+ w − 1)(2wx+ 3− 3w)
0 < 8w + 3(1− w)2
which is true when w ∈ (0, 1).
Lemma 3. The derivative of Ij with respect to x is greater than −1 when x, w, and p
are positive numbers less than 1.
















(1− 2x)(2wp+ w − 1)(2wpx+ 4 + (1− w)(3p− x))(
2wpx+ 4 + (1− w)(3p− x)
)2
− x(1− x)(2wp+ w − 1)(2wp− (1− w))(
2wpx+ 4 + (1− w)(3p− x)
)2
=
(1− 2x)(2wp+ w − 1)
2wpx+ 4 + (1− w)(3p− x)
− Ij ·
(
2wp+ w − 1






(1− 2x)Ij − (Ij)2
)
.
We now consider the second term of
dIj




∂x +P . We have
from Lemma 2 that
∂Ij
∂p is positive, and since p is a weighted average of terms including
x, ∂p∂x is a positive constant, hence P must be positive.
In order to determine for which x we have
dIj
dx > −1, we consider solutions to the








Multiplying by −x(1 − x) and gathering the terms on the right-hand side yields a
quadratic equation in Ij ,
0 = (Ij)
2 − (1− 2x)Ij − x(1− x)(P + 1).

















1 + 4x(1− x)P
)

















Ij < −x or Ij > 1− x
It is clear from equation (8) that if xn ∈ [0, 1], then xn+1 ∈ [0, 1], and so
0 ≤ x+ Ij(x) ≤ 1 =⇒ −x ≤ Ij(x) ≤ 1− x.
Therefore it is not possible for
dIj
dx = −1 in the interval (0, 1).
Ordering Lemma: Suppose a1 > b1 > c1. Then pA > pB > pC in all subsequent
rounds, and an > bn > cn when n ≥ 1.
Proof. We will prove the two results of this lemma separately. First, we show that the
effective populations follow the ordering pA > pB > pC given that an > bn > cn. We
will then show using mathematical induction that an > bn > cn for all rounds n under
the initial conditions established in (17).
The first assertion of this lemma is that the effective populations at each site
exhibit the same ordering as the actual population fractions in round n. This can
be seen by characterizing each of the effective populations as a weighted average of






q + [an](1− q)
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These two weighted averages have the same weights, namely q and 1 − q, so we show
that pB < pA by demonstrating that both values to be averaged in pA are greater than
the corresponding values in pB: that is we will establish that





















Towards establishing inequliaty (19), we note that because cn and bn are both less that










Inequality (19) follows immediately because the left-hand side is the weighted average
of terms that are each less than an. In a similar style, we prove inequality (20) by
showing that the left-hand side is the weighted average of two terms, each less than










Since q ∈ (0, 1), we have that 11+q >
q
1+q , and so this weighted average has a lesser
weight on an than bn. Since an > bn, we can increase the value of the weighted average
















We now consider the term





























It is clear that q1+2q <
1
1+q when q ∈ (0, 1), and so we can construct a larger weighted
average by replacing the coefficient of an from above with
1
1+q and adjusting the coef-


















since the latter weighted average places a higher weight on an and an > bn. Now we
have established inequality (20), since the left-hand side is a weighted average of terms
that are each less than the right-hand side.


























q + [cn](1− q),
and then constructing the corresponding pair of inequalities:































is a weighted average of values each of which is greater than cn, hence the average is
greater than cn as well.
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We show that inequality (22) is true much as we did for inequality (20). Since























Using the fact that an > bn, we now consider the first term of inequality (22)
qan + bn + qcn
1 + 2q
>









As before, we have that 1+q1+2q <
1
















Hence the left-hand side of inequality (22) is a weighted average of terms that are each
greater than the right-hand side, and so the inequality is true. Having established all
four inequalities, we now have that pA > pB > pC.
Now we address the assertion that an > bn > cn for all rounds n. Since the initial
conditions established in (17) have the ordering a1 > b1 > c1, this ensures the base
case is true. Now assume that an > bn > cn for some n ∈ N and consider the ordering
of an+1, bn+1, and cn+1. Let us write an+1 = an+IA(an) and bn+1 = bn+IB(bn). Then
bn+1 > an+1 if and only if bn − an > IA(an)− IB(bn), which would require
−1 > IA(an)− IB(bn)
an − bn
. (23)
Because pA > pB in round n and Lemma 2 states that the partial derivative of Ij with







Further, since IA is a rational function with a non-zero denominator in [0, 1], it is
continuous on [0, 1] and differentiable on (0, 1). Therefore the Mean Value Theorem








In light of equations (23) and (24), this would mean that there is some point at which
the derivative of IA with respect to x is less that −1, which contradicts Lemma 3.
Therefore an+1 > bn+1. The proof for bn+1 > cn+1 follows similarly.
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4 The Net Lateral Increment Function
As mentioned in Section 2, we wish to determine conditions under which one of the
player types in Site B will tend towards extinction. In order to further investigate
this question, we will use the function f(a, c) = IA(a) + IC(c), called the Net Lateral
Increment Function, which calculates the net increment in the lateral sites, A and C. In
this section we prepare for the discussion of the long-term behavior of the population
in Site B by establishing some important facts about f in the initial round of the
tournament.
Before beginning our analysis of the function f , we introduce the surface plot
f = 0 in order to provide some visualization of this function’s behavior. Note that f
depends on the tit-for-tat population fraction in each of the three sites, and so we
plot the level surface f = 0 as seen in Figure 5 in order to illustrate the regions in which




Figure 5: A graph of the level surface f(a, b, c) = 0. The region underneath the surface
is where f < 0, and the region above is where f > 0.
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a fixed value of b, namely b1 = λ. For this reason, we can consider just a cross section













Figure 6: A cross section of f for b = b1 = λ. The color map on the right illustrates
the positive region of f in red and the negative region in blue.
Given the fact that b = b1 = λ, both IA and IC simplify to the form
I(x) =
x(1− x)(p− λ)
px+ 2 + 4λ+ λ(3p− x)
.
We now consider the terms in this equation containing p for simplification. Using
equation (13), we can write
px =
(












































Substituting these formulations into the denominator of the increment yields
px+ 2 + 4λ+ λ(3p− x) = 2 + 4λ+
(















Factoring 1+q−q2/1+q from all terms on the right-hand side of equation (25) and simpli-
fying what remains,
px+ 2 + 4λ+ λ(3p− x) =
(
1 + q − q2
1 + q
)
(x2 + 2xλ+ k)
where k = 2 + 4λ+
q2(3λ2 + 4λ+ 2)
1 + q − q2
. (26)
In the numerator of I(x) we can again use equation (13) to write
p− λ =
(


























Hence the numerator of the increment is
x(1− x)(p− λ) = x(1− x)
(




Substituting these simplifications into the increment yields
I(x) =
(




1 + q − q2
1 + q
)
(x2 + 2xλ+ k)
=
x(1− x)(x− λ)
x2 + 2xλ+ k
. (27)
This formulation shows us that in the first round of the tournament, the function f(a, c)
has roots at
(0, 0), (λ, 0), (1, 0), (0, λ), (λ, λ), (λ, 1), (0, 1), (1, λ), (1, 1).
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Because IA(x) and IC(x) are both negative when x ∈ (0, λ), we know that f(a, c) < 0
when a, c ∈ (0, λ). Similarly, because IA(x) and IC(x) are both positive when x ∈ (λ, 1),
we know that f(a, c) > 0 when both arguments are in (λ, 1). This information is









































Figure 7: Circles indicate known points at which f = 0. The function is positive in the
upper-right square, and negative in the lower-left square.
The following lemmas extend our knowledge of the region in which f(a, c) is
positive. Lemmas 4 and 5 establish that f is positive along particular line segments
when λ is sufficiently small, and in Lemma 6 we prove that f is positive between them.
Lemma 4. There is a number λ1 ≥
√
1/5 such that f(λ + δ, λ − δ) > 0 in the first
round of the tournament, provided that δ ∈ (0, λ] and λ ∈ (0, λ1).
Proof. In the first round of the tournament we can write f(λ+ δ, λ− δ) as I(λ+ δ) +
I(λ − δ). We begin by considering the value of I(λ ± δ) using the formulation from
equation (27).
I(λ+ δ) =
(λ+ δ)(1− λ− δ)(δ)
(λ+ δ)2 + 2λ(λ+ δ) + k
I(λ− δ) = (λ− δ)(1− λ+ δ)(−δ)
(λ− δ)2 + 2λ(λ− δ) + k
32
We see that the denominator of both terms is positive since k > 0, so the polarity of f
depends on the combined numerator, denoted by NI
NI = (λ+ δ)(1− λ− δ)(δ)
[
(λ− δ)2 + 2λ(λ− δ) + k
]
+ (λ− δ)(1− λ+ δ)(−δ)
[
(λ+ δ)2 + 2λ(λ− δ) + k
]
= δ(λ+ δ − 2λδ − λ2 − δ2)
[
3λ2 + δ2 − 4λδ + k
]
− δ(λ− δ + 2λδ − λ2 − δ2)
[
3λ2 + δ2 + 4λδ + k
]
The similarity of the leading factors allows further simplification:
NI = δ
(








(1− 2λ)k + (1 + 2λ)δ2 − λ2 − 2λ3
)
This is positive when δ > 0 and
(1− 2λ)k − λ2 − 2λ3 > 0.
We first note that when λ < 1/2, the factor (1− 2λ) is positive and 2λ3 < λ2. Equation
(26) tells us that k > 2 + 4λ, hence
(1− 2λ)k − λ2 − 2λ3 > (1− 2λ)(2 + 4λ)− λ2 − 2λ3
> (2 + 4λ− 4λ− 8λ2)− λ2 − λ2
= 2− 10λ2.
Thus the numerator of f(λ + δ, λ − δ) is positive when 2 − 10λ2 is positive, which
happens when λ <
√
1/5.
Lemma 5. There is a number λ2 ∈ (0, 1/2] such that if λ ∈ (0, λ2), the following
statement is true in the first round of the tournament: there is a number α ∈ [2λ, 1)
such that f(α, c) > 0 when c ∈ [0, 1].
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Proof. Since I(x) as posed in equation (27) is a rational function with a non-zero
denominator in [0, 1], it is continuous on [0, 1]. Note that when λ = 0,
I(x) =
x(1− x)(x− λ)





This function has roots at x = 0 and x = 1 and is positive for x ∈ (0, 1). Therefore
Extreme Value Theorem tells us that it achieves a positive maximum value at some
α ∈ (0, 1), and so
Imax + Imin > 0, (28)
where Imax and Imin denote the maximum and minimum values of I(x) on [0, 1], re-
spectively. Because these critical points of I(x) vary continuously with λ, as does the
value of I(x) at those points, the inequality in (28) remains true when λ ∈ [0, 1) is
sufficiently small. We have then that
f(α, c) = Imax + IC(c) ≥ Imax + Imin > 0
for all c ∈ [0, 1]. Further, because α − 2λ varies continuously with λ and is positive
when λ = 0, we know that α > 2λ when λ is sufficiently small.




. In the first round of the tournament, the
value of f(a, b) is positive in the trapezoidal region of the ac−plane that is delimited by
the lines a+ c = 2λ, a = α, c = 0, and c = λ, except at the point (λ, λ).
Proof. We demonstrate this fact by showing that all possible roots of the net lateral
increment function f(a, c) must lie outside the trapezoid and that the functional value
inside the region is positive. Recall that
I(x) =
x(1− x)(x− λ)
x2 + 2λx+ k
,
where k is positive (and so the denominator is positive). This means that the function
has exactly three roots. We can also use long division to determine that
x(1− x)(x− λ)
x2 + 2λx+ k
= −x+ 3λ+ 1 + −x(k + λ+ 2λ(3λ+ 1)) + k(3λ+ 1)













































Figure 8: Incorporating information from Lemmas 4, 5, and 6 into Figure 7: the value
of f is positive along the new line segments and in the shaded trapezoidal region.
therefore the line y = −x + 3λ + 1 is an oblique asymptote to the graph of I(x) as
x→ ±∞.
On the upper boundary of the region we have that c = λ and a > λ, hence IC = 0
and IA > 0. This tells us then that f(a, c) > 0, and so we have established the result
for the upper boundary of the region excluding the point (λ, λ). We now consider the
value of f along horizontal line segments at fixed, but arbitrary, c∗ ∈ [0, λ). The oblique
asymptote of the increment function tells us that f(a, c∗) = IA(a) + IC(c
∗) is positive
when a is sufficiently negative, and negative when a is sufficiently large. Further, since
the increment function has exactly three roots, there can be at most three roots along
the horizontal line c = c∗. Figure 9 depicts these facts (and more from the proof to
follow).
We determine the locations of these roots by considering the polarity of f as we
move from left to right along the horizontal line. When a is sufficiently negative, the
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Figure 9: Polarity of the Net Lateral Increment Function as we move along fixed but
arbitrary horizontal lines.
that f(a, c∗) < 0 since IA(a) ≤ 0 and IC(c∗) < 0, hence one of the roots must occur
to the left of the [0, 1] × [0, 1] square of the ac−plane. As we continue to move right,
we encounter the line a + c = 2λ, which is the left border of the region. Lemma 4
tells us that the function is positive along this line, hence one of the roots lies between
a = λ and the line a + c = 2λ, which is still to the left of the region. We then move
right through the region and hit the vertical line a = α guaranteed by Lemma 5, and
we have that the function is positive here as well. As we continue moving right, the
oblique asymptote dictates that the function eventually become negative again, and so
one the roots occurs to the right of the vertical line a = α. Hence all three roots exists
outside of the region regardless of the choice of c∗, and so the function f(a, c) does not
vanish inside the region.
In the previous lemma we established a large region in which f(a, c) is positive
in the first round of the tournament when b = λ. The next lemma guarantees that f
remains positive in this region if b increases.
Lemma 7. The partial derivative of f with respect to b is positive.
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The factors of ∂IA∂pA and
∂IC
∂pC
are positive by virtue of Lemma 2, and equations (13) and




1+q > 0. Hence the partial derivative of f with respect
to b is positive, and so the region where f > 0 described in Lemma 6 remains positive
as b increases.
Lemma 8. Suppose a1 > b1 > c1, and f(an, cn) > 0. Then IA(an) > 0.
Proof. As seen in (16), the polarity of the increment function I(x) is determined solely
by the factor (p − λ) in its numerator. Since f(an, cn) > 0, it must be that one of
IA(an) or IC(cn) is positive. If it were true that IA(an) ≤ 0 < IC(cn), the respective
polarity-controlling factors of IA(an) and IC(cn) would exhibit the same ordering, i.e.
(pA − λ) < (pC − λ)⇒ pA < pC.
However, since a1 > b1 > c1, the Ordering Lemma tells us that pA > pB > pC for all
rounds n. This is a contradiction, so we conclude that IA(an) must be positive.
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5 Monotonic Increase of bn for Sufficiently Small λ
The simulations presented in Section 2 show that either player type can dominate Site
B in the long run. In this section we prove that tit-for-tat players will dominate
the middle site in the long run (bn → 1 as n→∞) for sufficiently small λ. Our proof
begins by showing that the increment IB(bn) > 0 in all rounds n ≥ 1. Since bn ≤ 1 by
definition, the sequence {bn}∞n=1 is bounded and monotonic, hence it must converge.
We conclude by demonstrating that the limit value of this sequence is 1.




, and a1, b1, and c1 are initialized as in
Section 2. Then {bn}∞n=1 is a monotonically increasing sequence.
Proof. As seen in (16), the polarity of IB(bn) is determined solely by the factor of
(pB − λ) in its numerator. Specifically, IB(bn) > 0 when pB > λ. Using equation (15),
we can rewrite pB > λ as(
q2 + 2q3 − q4
1 + 3q + 2q2
)
(an + cn) +
(
1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4
1 + 3q + 2q2
)
bn > λ.
Multiplying both sides by (1+q)(1+2q) = 1+3q+2q2 and moving the term containing
bn to the right-hand side yields
(q2 + 2q3 − q4)(an + cn) > (1 + 3q + 2q2)λ− (1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4)bn. (29)
We consider this inequality in the first round when b1 = λ.
(q2 + 2q3 − q4)(a1 + c1) > (1 + 3q + 2q2)λ− (1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4)λ
(q2 + 2q3 − q4)(a1 + c1) > (2q2 + 4q3 − 2q4)λ
a1 + c1 > 2λ
In the first round we have that a1 = λ+ ε(1− λ) and c1 = λ− ελ from (17), so
a1 + c1 = λ+ ε(1− λ) + λ− ελ
= 2λ− 2ελ+ ε
= 2λ+ ε(1− 2λ).
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Since λ < 1/2, the quantity 1− 2λ is positive, hence
a1 + c1 > 2λ.
Since the inequality holds in the first round, we have that pB > λ and b2 > b1.
Additionally, note that a1 > λ > c1. Recalling the role of α from Lemma 5, we
see that if a1 ≤ α, the point (a1, c1) lies in the region of the ac−plane where, according
to Lemma 6, the value of the net lateral increment function, f , is positive. We wish to
consider how the point (an, cn) moves through the plane from one round to the next,
and so we formulate its movement as the vector 〈IA(an), IC(cn)〉. Lemma 8 then tells us
that IA(a1) > 0, so the vector 〈IA(a1), IC(c1)〉 points to the right. Since f(a1, c1) > 0,
we know that the vector cannot have a slope less than -1, otherwise this would imply
that |IC(c1)| > IA(a1) and so f < 0. Since (a1, c1) lies above the line a + c = 2λ and
the vector 〈IA(a1), IC(c1)〉 points to the right along a line with slope greater than -1,
we have that (a2, c2) also lies above the line a + c = 2λ. In fact, because b2 > b1,
the inequality in (29) has become easier to satisfy: that inequality says that the point
(an, cn) must lie above the line,
(q2 + 2q3 − q4)(an + cn) = (1 + 3q + 2q2)λ− (1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4)bn, (30)
in order for the increment in Site B to be positive. As bn increases, we see that the
a−intercept of this line decreases. In short, in the transition from the first to the
second round of the tournament, the number bn increases, the point (an, cn) moves
to the right, and the line from equation (30), which is where pB = λ, slides left. If
a2 ≤ α, the preceding argument is reapplied to show that a3 > a2, b3 > b2, and the
point (a3, c3) lies above the line where pB = λ. The argument continues to apply until
an > α, at which point we are no longer certain that f(an, cn) > 0. This process is
demonstrated in Figure 10.
Now we argue that bn is monotonically increasing when an > α (including the
case when this is true of a1). In the first such round we have that an > λ and bn ≥ λ,
and so pA > λ. It follows that IA(an) > 0, and so (an+1, cn+1) is to the right of (an, cn)
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in the ac−plane. Further, the point (an, cn) lies above the line pB = λ because the
a−intercept of the line is at
a =
(1 + 3q + 2q2)λ− (1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4)bn
(q2 + 2q3 − q4)
≤ (1 + 3q + 2q
2)λ− (1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4)b1
(q2 + 2q3 − q4)
= 2λ < α
by virtue of Lemma 5. It follows that bn+1 > bn. Further, because pA > λ in round n,
and both a and b have increased from round n to round n + 1, we know that pA > λ
in round n + 1 as well. The point (an+1, cn+1) lies above the line pB = λ, and this




























Figure 10: Schematic representation of the motion of (an, cn) through the ac-plane.
The line at which pB = λ moves left each time bn increases.




, and a1, b1, and c1 are initialized as in




Proof. Because bn is increasing monotonically and is bounded above by 1, it must
converge, say bn → L. Consequently,




















In principle, equation (31) could be true because pB → λ as bn → L, so our proof relies
heavily on the fact, established below, that there is a number pδ such that pB ≥ pδ > λ
in all rounds of the tournament.
We wish to construct a δ such that the line a + c = 2λ + δ remains below the
point (an, cn) for all rounds n ≥ 1. First, since λ < λ2, Lemma 5 guarantees a
value α ∈ [2λ, 1) such that f(α, c) > 0 when c ∈ [0, 1]. The net lateral increment
function is uniformly continuous on [0, 1]× [0, 1], so there exists some δ1 > 0 such that
f(α + δ, c) > 0 when δ ∈ (0, δ1) and c ∈ [0, 1]. Further, in the first round of the
tournament we know that
a1 + c1 = 2λ+ ε(1− 2λ),
where ε(1 − 2λ) > 0 since λ < 1/2. Let us define δ2 = ε(1 − 2λ), and then let
δ = 0.5min{δ1, δ2}. Then the segment of the line a+ c = 2λ+ δ on which c ∈ [0, λ] lies
in the region where f(a, c) > 0, and in the first round we have
a1 + c1 > 2λ+ δ.
In Theorem 1 we saw that when (a1, c1) begins above the line a + c = 2λ, the point
(an, cn) remains above that line in all subsequent rounds due to the fact that the
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vector 〈IA(an), IC(cn)〉 points along a line with slope greater than −1 until an > α.
Since (a1, c1) starts above the line a+ c = 2λ+ δ as well, the slope argument applies,
and in fact will hold until an > α + δ. We know from Theorem 1 that when an > α,
IB(bn) > 0 for all subsequent rounds. In the present case where an > α + δ, we can
apply this same argument to determine that the point (an, cn) remains above the line
a+ c = 2λ+ δ for all rounds n ≥ 1.
We know that the points on the line a+ c = 2λ correspond to pB = λ in the first
round, so we now consider a similar correspondence for the rounds when an + cn ≥
2λ + δ. We do so by following the derivation of equation (29) in reverse, and so we
begin by multiplying both sides of the inequality by q2(1 + 2q − q2), which is positive
since q ∈ (0, 1),
q2(1 + 2q − q2)(an + cn) ≥ 2q2(1 + 2q − q2)λ+ q2(1 + 2q − q2)δ.
Using the fact that b1 = λ,
q2(1 + 2q − q2)(an + cn) ≥ (1 + 3q + 2q2)λ− (1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4)b1 + q2(1 + 2q − q2)δ.
We then divide both sides by (1 + q)(1 + 2q) = 1 + 3q + 2q2 and note that bn > b1 for
all n > 1 by virtue of Theorem 1, which yields
q2 + 2q3 − q4
1 + 3q + 2q2
(an + cn) ≥ λ−
1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4
1 + 3q + 2q2
bn +
q2(1 + 2q − q2)
1 + 3q + 2q2
δ.
Moving the term containing bn to the left-hand side gives us the definition for pB, hence
pB ≥ λ+
q2(1 + 2q − q2)
1 + 3q + 2q2
δ.
We define pδ to be the value on the right-hand side of this inequality, and so pB ≥ pδ > λ
for all rounds n ≥ 1.
Now that we have bounded pB away from λ, we know that the increment must
converge in the interval (λ, 1]. We show that L = 1 by bounding the increment below
by a quadratic function with roots at 0 and 1 that is positive in (0, 1), and so the
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increment can only converge to 0 if the quadratic function does as well. We consider
the definition of the increment and use the fact that pB ≥ pδ to show that
IB(bn) = (pB − λ)
bn(1− bn)
pBbn + 2 + 4λ+ λ(3pB − bn)
≥
(
q2(1 + 2q − q2)




pBbn + 2 + 4λ+ λ(3pB − bn)
.
Since pB, bn ∈ [0, 1], the denominator of the second factor is no more than 1 + 2 + 4λ+
3λ = 3 + 7λ, so
IB(bn) ≥
(
q2(1 + 2q − q2)






That is, IB(bn) ≥ Aδbn(1− bn) where
A =
q2(1 + 2q − q2)
(1 + q)(1 + 2q)(3 + 7λ)
is a positive constant. Since 0 ≤ Aδbn(1 − bn) ≤ IB(bn) when pB > pδ, the Squeeze
Theorem tells us that this quadratic expression must converge to 0 wherever the incre-
ment does. Because bn is increasing and the quadratic expression only has roots at 0
and 1, it must be that lim
n→∞
bn = L = 1.
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6 Monotonic Decrease of bn for Sufficiently Large λ
In the previous section, we showed that for sufficiently small values of λ, the middle
site tit-for-tat population, bn, tends to 1 as n→∞. In this section we establish the
symmetric result: for sufficiently large λ, bn will tend to 0 as n → ∞. We do so by
first adjusting several lemmas from Section 4, and then proceeding as in Section 5.
Lemma 4b. Suppose λ ∈ (1/2, 1). Then f(λ + δ, λ − δ) < 0 in the first round of
the tournament, provided that δ ∈ (0, 1− λ].
Proof. We begin by noting that because λ ∈ (1/2, 1], the line formed by the points
(λ+ δ, λ− δ) for δ > 0 intersects the right-hand edge of the [0, 1]× [0, 1] square in the
ac−plane. This intersection occurs precisely when δ = 1 − λ, and so we consider the
mathematically useful hypothesis that δ ≤ 1 − λ since it has no effect on the model
itself. As in Lemma 4 we consider the numerator of f(λ+ δ, λ− δ),
2δ2
[
(1 + 2λ)δ2 + k(1− 2λ)− λ2 − 2λ3
]
,
which is unchanged from the derivation in the Lemma 4. For large lambda, specifically
λ > 1/2, we have that (1 − 2λ) < 0. Combined with the fact that k > 2 + 4λ by its
definition in equation (27), it follows from δ ≤ 1− λ that
(1 + 2λ)δ2 + k(1− 2λ)− λ2 − 2λ3
≤ (1 + 2λ)(1− λ)2 + (2 + 4λ)(1− 2λ)− λ2 − 2λ3
= (1 + 2λ)(1− 2λ+ λ2) + 2− 4λ+ 4λ− 8λ2 − λ2 − 2λ3
= 1− 2λ+ λ2 + 2λ− 4λ2 + 2λ3 + 2− 9λ2 − 2λ3
= 3− 12λ2,
which is negative when λ > 1/2. Hence f(λ+ δ, λ− δ) < 0 in the first round.
Lemma 5b. There is a number λ3 ∈ [1/2, 1) such that the following statement is
true in the first round of the tournmanet if λ ∈ (λ3, 1): there is a number γ ∈ (0, 2λ−1]
such that f(a, γ) < 0 when a ∈ [0, 1].
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Proof. As in Lemma 5, we begin by examining the function I(x) when λ = 1, so
I(x) =
x(1− x)(x− λ)
x2 + 2λx+ k
=
−x(1− x)2
x2 + 2x+ k
.
This function has roots at 0 and 1, and it is negative when x ∈ (0, 1). This means that
I(x) achieves a negative minimum value for some γ ∈ (0, 1), and that Imax + Imin < 0.
As stated in Lemma 5, the uniform continuity of I(x) tells us that the critical points
vary continuously with λ as do the values of I(x) at these points. This means the
inequality remains true when λ ∈ [0, 1] is sufficiently large, and that the value of
f(a, γ) is negative when a ∈ [0, 1] since
f(a, γ) = IA(a) + Imin ≤ Imax + Imin < 0.
Further, because (2λ − 1) − γ varies continuously with λ and is positive when λ = 1,











































Figure 11: Incorporating information from Lemmas 4b, 5b, and 6b: the value of f is
negative along the line segments c = γ, a + c = 2λ, a = λ, and inside the shaded,
trapezoidal region (excpet at the point (λ, λ)).
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. In the first round of the tournament,
the value of f(a, c) is negative in the trapezoidal region of the ac−plane that is delimited
by the lines a+ c = 2λ, a = λ, a = 1, and c = γ, except at the point (λ, λ).
Proof. As in Lemma 6, we demonstrate this fact by fixing arbitrary values of a∗ ∈ (λ, 1],
showing that all three roots of f lie outside the region, and demonstrating that the
value is negative on the interior. Recall that
I(x) =
x(1− x)(x− λ)
x2 + 2λx+ k
.
In Lemma 6 we determined that this function only has three roots and has the oblique
asymptote y = −x + 3λ + 1 as x → ±∞. On the left-most boundary of the region,
we have that a = λ and and c < λ, hence IA = 0 and IC < 0, so f(a, c) < 0. This
establishes the result on the left-most boundary except for the point (λ, λ). We now
consider the value of f along vertical line segments for fixed but arbitrary a∗ ∈ (λ, 1].
The oblique asymptote tells us that f(a∗, c) = IA(a
∗) + IC(c) is positive when c is
sufficiently negative, and negative when c is sufficiently positive. As in Lemma 6,
we locate the three roots of the equation f(a∗, c) by moving from bottom to top and
observing the polarity of f in certain regions.
When c is sufficiently negative, the oblique asymptote tells us that f is positive.
We next encounter the line c = γ, and Lemma 5b tells us that f(a∗, γ) < 0, hence the
first root must be below the line c = γ. Lemma 4b gives us that f is again negative
on the line a+ c = 2λ, which is the upper boundary of the region. We then cross into
the region where c ∈ (λ, 1] and a∗ > λ, so it must be that f(a∗, c) is positive in this
region and another root occurs just above the line a + c = 2λ. Finally, as c becomes
sufficiently positive, the oblique asymptote dictates that f turns negative, and so the
final root occurs above the line c = 1. Therefore all three roots exist outside the region,
and since a∗ was chosen arbitrarily, we have that f does not vanish inside.
Lemma 8b. Suppose a1 > b1 > c1 and f(an, cn) < 0. Then IC(cn) < 0.
46
Proof. We know that at least one of IA(an) and IC(cn) is negative because f(an, cn) < 0.
Following the proof from Lemma 8, the assumption that IA < 0 < IC implies that
pA < λ < pC, which contradicts the Ordering Lemma. Therefore is must be that
IC(cn) < 0.




, and a1, b1, and c1 are initialized
as in Section 2. Then bn decreases monotonically.
Proof. Recall that the polarity of IB(x) is determined solely by the factor of (pB − λ)
in its numerator, so that IB(bn) < 0 precisely when pB < λ. Using the derivation of
equation (29), but reversing the inequality so that IB(bn) < 0, we find that IB(bn) is
negative when
(q2 + 2q3 − q4)(an + cn) < (1 + 3q + 2q2)λ− (1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4)bn.
In this first round we have that b1 = λ, so this inequality reduces to a1 + c1 < 2λ. This
is satisfied since
a1 + c1 = λ+ ε(1− λ) + λ− ελ
= 2λ+ ε(1− 2λ),
and λ > 1/2. Hence b2 < b1.
It is clear from the initialization that (a1, c1) lies in the region defined in Lemma
6b where f(a, c) < 0, so Lemma 8b tells us that IC(c1) < 0, and hence the vector
〈IA(a1), IC(c1)〉 points downward in the ac−plane. In fact, since f(a1, c1) < 0, the
vector must point along a line with slope less than −1, and so the point (a2, c2) also
lies below the line a+ c = 2λ. We can repeat this process until cn < γ, after which it
is not certain that f(a, c) < 0.
We now show that bn is monotonically decreasing even when cn < γ, including
the case when this is true for n = 1. Since cn < λ and bn ≤ λ, we know that pC < λ.
It follows that IC(cn) < 0, so (an+1, cn+1) lies below (an, cn) in the ac−place. We
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also have from Lemma 5b that γ < 2λ − 1, and so the point (an, cn) lies below the
intersection of the lines a + c = 2λ and a = 1. Hence (an+1, cn+1) lies below the line
as well. Consequently, bn+1 < bn, and since both b and c have decreased from round
n to round n + 1, this argument can be reapplied. The conclusion of monotonicity
follows.




and a1, b1, and c1 are initialized as
in Section 2. Then lim
n→∞
bn = 0.
Proof. Because bn is decreasing monotonically and is bounded below by 0, it must
converge to some value L ∈ [0, λ). We saw in Theorem 2 that in order for {bn} to
converge, the increment IB(bn) must converge to 0. It could again be the case that this
is true because pB → λ, so we begin by showing that there exists some number pδ such
that pB ≤ pδ < λ in all rounds of the tournament.
As in Theorem 2, we wish to construct a δ such that the line a + c = 2λ − δ
remains above the point (an, cn) for all rounds n ≥ 1. First, since λ > λ3, Lemma 5b
guarantees a value γ ∈ (0, 2λ− 1] such that (a, γ) < 0 when a ∈ [0, 1]. We have noted
before that the net lateral increment function is uniformly continuous on [0, 1]× [0, 1],
so there exists some δ1 > 0 such that f(a, γ − δ) < 0 when δ ∈ (0, δ1) and a ∈ [0, 1].
Second, in the first round of the tournament we have seen that
a1 + c1 = 2λ+ ε(1− 2λ),
where ε(1 − 2λ) < 0 since λ > 0.5. Let us define δ2 = |ε(1 − 2λ)|, and then δ =
0.5min{δ1, δ2}. Then the segment of the line a + c = 2λ − δ on which a ∈ [2λ − 1, 1]
lies in the region where f(a, c) < 0, and in the first round we have
a1 + c1 < 2λ− δ.
As in Theorem 2, we see that because the point (a1, c1) starts below the line a + c =
2λ− δ and the vector 〈IA(an), IC(cn)〉 has a slope less than −1 while cn ≥ γ, the point
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(an, cn) will remain below the line for all rounds until cn < γ. In fact, this argument
holds until cn < γ − δ, at which point we can use the argument from Theorem 1b for
when cn < γ to determine that the point (an, cn) remains below the line a+ c = 2λ− δ
for all rounds n ≥ 1.
We now wish to find a relationship between the region an + cn ≤ 2λ − δ and pB,
and the derivation is nearly equivalent to the one seen in Theorem 2. The final result
of this derivation tells us that
an + cn ≤ 2λ− δ ⇐⇒ pB ≤ λ−
q2(1 + 2q − q2)
1 + 3q + 2q2
δ.
We take this quantity on the right to be pδ, and so pB ≤ pδ < λ for all rounds n ≥ 1.
Now that we have bounded pB away from λ, we know that the increment must
converge in the interval [0, λ). As in Theorem 2, we show that L = 0 by bounding
the increment with a quadratic function (in this case, it will be bounded above) of the
form −Aδbn(1− bn). The Squeeze Theorem tells us then that the increment can only
converge to 0 if the quadratic function does as well, and this only occurs at bn = {0, 1}.
We consider the form of the increment function
IB(bn) = (pB − λ)
bn(1− bn)




2(1 + 2q − q2)




pBbn + 2 + 4λ+ λ(3pB − bn)
.




q2(1 + 2q − q2)






That is, IB(bn) ≤ −Aδbn(1− bn) where
A =
q2(1 + 2q − q2)
2(1 + q)(1 + 2q)(1 + λ)
is a positive constant. Since IB(bn) ≤ −Aδbn(1− bn) ≤ 0, the Squeeze Theorem tells us
that the quadratic expression must converge to 0 wherever the increment does. Because
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bn is decreasing and the quadratic expression only has roots at 0 and 1, it must be that
lim
n→∞
bn = L = 0.
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7 Analysis of Nontrivial Equilibria
In the previous sections we established that if λ is sufficiently small or sufficiently
large in [0, 1], one player type or the other is driven to extinction in the middle site.
A natural question is whether middle values of λ allow for a steady-state solution in
which lim
n→∞
bn 6∈ {0, 1} exists, and if so, if it is accessible given the initialization of
the system. This leads us to look for equilibria, which are points (a, b, c) at which
(IA, IB, IC) = (0, 0, 0), and we have seen previously that the increment I(x) = 0 if and
only if x = 0, x = 1, or p = λ. Since we are looking for equilibria (a, b, c) in which b is
neither 0 nor 1, it must be that pB = λ. For such points the Ordering Lemma dictates
that either a = 1 or pA = λ, and similarly that c = 0 or pC = λ.
We separate our analysis of non-trivial equilibria into two parts. In the first
subsection we determine equilibria that are admissible given the behavior of the system.
This work will show that the only potential candidates are the steady-state solutions
when (pA, pB, pC) = (λ, λ, λ) or when (a, c) = (1, 0) and pB = λ. In the second and
third subsections we perform a linear stability analysis on these two possible solutions
to determine their stability with respect to a, b, and c.
7.1 Existence of Non-Trivial Equilibria
As demonstrated previously, the condition that (IA, IB, IC) = (0, 0, 0) restricts the set
of steady-state solutions to four possibilities:
{pA = λ, pB = λ, c = 0} {a = 1, pB = λ, pC = λ}
{pA = λ, pB = λ, pC = λ} {a = 1, pB = λ, c = 0}.
We begin with the case when {pA = λ, pB = λ, c = 0}. We will show that these
conditions do not satisfy the Ordering Lemma, and hence are unreachable by our
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system. We begin by setting pA = λ and pB = λ, given the fact that c = 0.
λ = pA =
(









λ = pB =
(
q2 + 2q3 − q4




1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4
1 + 3q + 2q2
)
b
We have then that the two right-hand sides are equal, and so we can solve for a in
terms of b and q as
a =
(
1 + 3q − q2 − 6q3 + 2q4
1 + 3q − 4q3 + q4
)
b. (32)
The Ordering Lemma dictates that a ≥ b, so either a = b = 0 or
1 + 3q − q2 − 6q3 + 2q4
1 + 3q − 4q3 + q4
≥ 1
1 + 3q − q2 − 6q3 + 2q4 ≥ 1 + 3q − 4q3 + q4
q2 + 2q3 − q4 ≤ 0.
However, since q ∈ (0, 1), we have that
q2 + 2q3 − q4 > q2 + q3 > 0.
Therefore equation (32) can only be true if a = b = c = 0, which is a trivial equilibrium.
Next we consider the case when {a = 1, pB = λ, pC = λ}. As before, we consider
the system of equations when pC = λ and pB = λ, given that a = 1.
λ = pC =
(









λ = pB =
(
q2 + 2q3 − q4




1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4
1 + 3q + 2q2
)
b




1 + 3q − q2 − 6q3 + 2q4




q2 + 2q3 − q4
1 + 3q − 4q3 + q4
)
. (33)
The Ordering Lemma tells us that b ≥ c, so
b ≥
(
1 + 3q − q2 − 6q3 + 2q4




q2 + 2q3 − q4




Solving for b yields the inequality(
q2 + 2q3 − q4
1 + 3q − 4q3 + q4
)
b ≥ q
2 + 2q3 − q4
1 + 3q − 4q3 + q4
b ≥ 1.
Since b is a population fraction, b ≤ 1, so this can only be true if b = 1. In this case,
equation (33) tells us that
c =
(
1 + 3q − q2 − 6q3 + 2q4




q2 + 2q3 − q4
1 + 3q − 4q3 + q4
)
= 1.
Therefore a = b = c = 1, which is a trivial equilibrium.
We now consider the final two possibilities for equilibria. The case when pA =
pB = pC = λ is equivalent to the steady-state solution (a, b, c) = (λ, λ, λ). This can be
seen most clearly when considering pA = pC, in which case(




















The Ordering Lemma then tells us that a ≥ b ≥ c, and so it must be that a = b = c = λ
in order for pA = pB = pC = λ. It is easy to show that for any particular ε > 0, this
equilibrium is not reachable given the constraints of the Ordering Lemma. In order
to show this fact, we consider Site A. Since a1 > λ under the initial conditions of the
system, the tit-for-tat population in Site A can only reach λ if IA(an) < 0 for some
round n. This requires that pA < λ, and so by the Ordering Lemma pC < pB < pA < λ.
Hence in the following round, all three tit-for-tat populations will decrease, and so
pA will remain less than λ. This argument can then be reapplied to show that all three
populations will continue to decrease, hence cn < λ and only decreases in subsequent
rounds.
Though this candidate for an equilibrium is unreachable given our particular initial
conditions, we will still analyze its stability in the following subsection. We will also
investigate the case when {a = 1, pB = λ, c = 0} as this potential equilibrium does not
contradict the Ordering Lemma, hence it is an admissible steady-state solution.
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7.2 Linear Stability Analysis of {a = 1, pB = λ, c = 0}
Now that we have established that only two of the four non-trivial equilibria are ad-
missible in the three-site scenario according to the Ordering Lemma, we investigate
the linear stability of these equilibria. Let us define I : R3 → R3 as the function that
updates population numbers in the three sites:
I(an, bn, cn) = (an+1, bn+1, cn+1).
We’ll denote the first component function of this mapping by IA(a, b, c), and similarly
for B and C. Using the form of the increment function introduced by equation (18)
but suppressing its dependence on w, which is constant in any particular multi-site
tournament, we have IA = a + IA(a, pA). Note that IA is independent of c, and that
it depends on b only through pA. The second and third component functions of I are
IB = b + IB(b, pB) and IC = c + IC(c, pC), respectively. Using this notation, we write






















We begin by considering the equilibrium at which {a = 1, pB = λ, c = 0}. Let b∗
represent the tit-for-tat population required in Site B so that pB = λ. Given that
a = 1 and c = 0, the equation λ = pB can be written as
λ =
q2 + 2q3 − q4
1 + 3q + 2q2
+
1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4




(1 + 3q + 2q2)λ− (q2 + 2q3 − q4)
1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4
. (34)
Now we use the Jacobian matrix to analyze the linear stability at (1, b∗, 0). Since
the lateral site increments are independent of the each other’s tit-for-tat population,
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a(1− a)(pA − λ)















= 0 + 0 · ∂pA
∂b
= 0.
A similar analysis shows that the partial derivative of IC with respect to b is 0, so the













The characteristic polynomial tells us that the eigenvalues of this matrix are pre-
cisely the diagonal elements, which we consider next. We established that ∂IA/∂pA = 0















a(1− a)(pA − λ)
pAa+ 2 + 4λ+ λ(3pA − a)
)
+ 0. (36)
We consider this derivative using Quotient Rule by letting f = a(1 − a)(pA − λ) and
g = pAa+ 2 + 4λ+ λ(3pA − a). Since we are evaluating at a = 1, it follows that f = 0,


























= (1− a)(pA − λ)− a(pA − λ)
∣∣
a=1
= −(pA − λ).







pA + 2 + 4λ+ λ(3pA − 1)
< 1
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(1− c)(pC − λ)
4 + (1− w)(3pC)
< 1





















b(1− b)(pB − λ)





















We know from Lemma 2 that ∂IB/∂pB > 0, and since pB is simply a weighted average
of a, b, and c, we know that the coefficient of the weighted average isolated by ∂pB/∂b




With two eigenvalues less than 1, and one eigenvalue larger than 1, we see that this






















the direction of instability is in the b−direction. However, since we are working with a
discrete dynamical system, it is possible, in principle, to “jump” the region of instability
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in the b−direction and then approach the equilibrium along a stable manifold. In the
following theorem we establish that it is neither possible to step on to the equilibrium
nor to approach it in the limit.
Theorem 3. The point (1, b∗, 0) is inaccessible in the three-site line.
Proof. We begin by showing that it is not possible to step onto (1, b∗, 0) even if the
system approaches it in the limit. Suppose that an 6= 1. In order to step onto the
equilibrium, there must be some round n such that
1− an = IA(an)
1− an =
an(1− an)(pA − λ)
pAan + 2 + 4λ+ λ(3pA − an)
1 =
an(pA − λ)
pAan + 2 + 4λ+ λ(3pA − an)
.





This is clearly impossible in our system, and so if a1 6= 1, then an 6= 1 for all n ∈ N. A
similar analysis demonstrates that IC(cn) 6= −cn if c1 6= 0, and so it is not possible to
step onto the equilibrium.
We now consider the case where the system approaches (1, b∗, 0) along some stable
manifold. Suppose that for some round n, bn = b
∗. In order for bn+1 = b
∗ also, it must
be that λ = pB, which we write as
λ =
(
q2 + 2q3 − q4
1 + 3q + 2q2
)
(an + cn) +
1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4
1 + 3q + 2q2
b∗. (37)
After substituting in the value of b∗ from equation (34) and simplifying, we see that
equation (37) is equivalent to
1 = an + cn.
Suppose that in round n, we have that an + cn = 1 and bn = b
∗, so pB = λ. Then in
round n+ 1, we still have that bn+1 = b
∗, but in order for an+1 + cn+1 = an + IA(an) +
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cn + IC(cn) = 1, it must be that IA(an) + IC(cn) = f(an, cn) = 0. If f(an, cn) 6= 0, then
an+1 + cn+1 6= 1, and so pB 6= λ. It follows that bn+2 6= b∗.
Let N ∈ N and suppose that for all n ≥ N , bn = b∗. This can only be true if the
point (an, cn) 6= (1, 0) lies on the line an + cn = 1 and on the level curve f(an, cn) = 0
for all n ≥ N . Since this must be true for infinitely many n, there must be infinitely
many intersections of the two curves. A direct application of the Mean Value Theorem
tells us that this implies there must be infinitely many places where the slope of the
tangent line to the level curve equals the slope of the line, −1. So let us determine
values of a for which
−∂f/∂c
∂f/∂a



















a(1− a)(pA − λ)
pAa+ 2 + 4λ+ λ(3pA − a)
)
Using the fact that b = b∗ and the definition of pA from equation (13), we see
that f is just a rational expression in both a and c, so its derivatives will be rational
expressions as well. Substituting c = 1 − a yields rational expressions in a for both
∂f/∂a and ∂f/∂c, so we can multiply equation (38) by the common denominator of these
fractions, and then collect all the terms on one side of the equation to write it as
P(a) = 0, where P(a) is some polynomial in a. The Fundamental Theorem of Algebra
tells us that there are only finitely many values of a that satisfy this equation, and
so there cannot be infinitely many intersections of the line a + c = 1 and the curve
f(a, c) = 0. Therefore for any N ∈ N, there exists an k ≥ N such that bk 6= b∗.
This result tells us that it is not possible for bn to remain b
∗ as an → 1 and
cn → 0, and so the middle site population will consistently jump off of b∗. Nor can these
perturbations converge to 0 as (a, c)→ (1, 0) as this would require the point (an, bn, cn)
to enter the linear regime of the equilibrium, and the linear stability analysis shows
that the equilibrium is linearly unstable in the b−direction. Therefore it is not possible
58
to converge to {a = 1, pB = λ, c = 0} from any direction.
7.3 Linear Stability Analysis of {a = λ, b = λ, c = λ}
As with the previous equilibrium, we begin by analyzing the Jacobian of the system











































1 + q − q2
1 + q
.
Consequently, in the case when a = b = c = λ, the first element of the Jacobian matrix
has the form




2 + 4λ+ 3λ2
and QA1 =
1 + q − q2
1 + q
.













where we consider the value of each partial derivative. In this case, since IA does not
directly depend on b, we have that ∂IA/∂b = 0. We also note that the term ∂IA/∂pA is
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We now see that the second entry to the Jacobian has the form
J1,2 = ΛQA2





Finally, since IA is independent of c, the third entry of the Jacobian will be 0. The
remaining elements of the Jacobian matrix are derived similarly, and have similar form.
The value of Λ is the same for each element of the matrix since ∂I/∂p is site-independent
and we are considering the case when a = b = c = λ. By contrast, the Q−terms vary
but exhibit symmetry between the lateral sites. In particular, the Q−terms are simply
the coefficients in the weighted averages pA, pB, and pC. With this understanding, we
write the Jacobian matrix as
J =

1 + ΛQA1 ΛQA2 0
ΛQB1 1 + ΛQB2 ΛQB1










q2 + 2q3 − q4
1 + 3q + 2q2
QB2 =
1 + 3q − 4q3 + 2q4
1 + 3q + 2q2
.
The structure of this matrix makes it easy to pick out possible eigenvectors for the
system. In particular, we see that both 〈1, 0,−1〉 and 〈1, 1, 1〉 are eigenvectors since
1 + ΛQA1 ΛQA2 0
ΛQB1 1 + ΛQB2 ΛQB1














1 + ΛQA1 ΛQA2 0
ΛQB1 1 + ΛQB2 ΛQB1








1 + Λ(QA1 +QA2 )
1 + Λ(2QB1 +QB2 )







This also tells us that the eigenvalues corresponding to 〈1, 0,−1〉 and 〈1, 1, 1〉 are 1 +
ΛQA1 and 1 + Λ, respectively. Both of these eigenvalues are greater than 1, so they
indicate instability in the corresponding directions. The final eigenvector is not as
obvious, and so we consider an eigenvector of the form 〈1, x, 1〉, where x ∈ R. We
determine the value of x by using the system
1 + ΛQA1 ΛQA2 0
ΛQB1 1 + ΛQB2 ΛQB1








1 + Λ(QA1 + xQA2 )
x+ Λ(2QB1 + xQB2 )
1 + Λ(QA1 + xQA2 )
 . (39)
Since the proposed eigenvector has the form 〈1, x, 1〉, the ratio between the second and
first components on the right-hand side of equation (39) must be x : 1. That is
x
(
1 + Λ(QA1 + xQA2 )
)
= x+ Λ(2QB1 + xQB2 ).
This is a quadratic polynomial in x, namely
(QA2 )x2 + (QA1 −QB2 )x− 2QB1 = 0. (40)
We already have that one root of this polynomial is x = 1 since 〈1, 1, 1〉 is an eigenvector
of the system. Thus we can factor out the quantity (x− 1), leaving us with




−2(1 + 2q − q2)
1 + 2q
.
Note that the linear term that results from expanding the product on the left-hand
side of this equation is
2QB1 −QA2 = (1−QB2 )− (1−QA1 ) = QA1 −QB2 ,









The corresponding eignevalue is just 1 + Λ(QA1 + xQA2 ). It is possible that this value is





















)∣∣ = ∣∣−16 ∣∣ < 1. Since all of these values change
continuously with q, it is clear that for some large values of q, this eqilibrium will have
a stable direction. However, the constraint of the Ordering Lemma limits the directions
from which we can approach the equilibrium, and the stable eigenvector is tangential
to the wedge representing valid 3-tuples for our system, which means that it is not















Figure 12: The region of permissible 3-tuples given the Ordering Lemma (blue &
orange) and the three eigenvectors for the equilibrium at (λ, λ, λ) numbered in the
order they are discussed.
The fact that this stability is present seems to indicate that there may be other
initial conditions, not of the form
a1 = λ+ ε(1− λ)
b1 = λ
c1 = λ− ελ,
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from which it is possible to approach a nontrivial equilibrium in Site B. In particular,
this eigenvector implies that the stable equilibrium appears if q is sufficiently large and
if a, c > λ > b, or vice versa. Consider the case when a, c > λ > b. In terms of the IPD
tournament, this stable equilibrium corresponds to the situation when the two lateral
sites are both skewed in favor of tit-for-tat players. In this case, the lateral site
influence the player pool in the middle site, and so pB > λ. However, the traveling
population from Site B exerts a similarly significant influence on both of the individual
sites, meaning that pA, pC < λ. Hence the fraction of tit-for-tat players in the lateral
sites is reduced, but the fraction in the middle site rises. This draws the three-site line
to the steady-state solution (λ, λ, λ).
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8 Numerical Estimates
The proof that bn → 1 when λ is sufficiently small seen in Section 5 requires that
0 < λ < min{λ1, λ2}, where λ1 and λ2 are the numbers guaranteed by Lemmas 4 and
5. Similarly, in Section 6 we establish that bn → 0 when 1 > λ > max{1/2, λ3}, where
λ3 is guaranteed by Lemma 5b. In between “sufficiently small” and “sufficiently large”
λ, bn exhibits transient behavior as seen in Figure 8. In this section we investigate
numerically which values of λ correspond to tit-for-tat dominance in the middle
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Figure 13: Graph of the transient behavior seen in the demographic of Site B for
λ = 0.487004566.
Toward establishing this numerical evidence, we constructed a simulation environ-
ment in which we implemented the model proposed in this paper. These simulations
were run in MatLab R© and used the process described by equation (8) in order to
update each of the three populations. As described below, the limiting behavior of bn
was detected by observing its value cross a threshold.
We know from the Ordering Lemma that an ≥ bn ≥ cn, so for any value of bn the
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weighted average pB is minimized when an = bn and cn = 0. In this case,











Consequently when bn is greater than this value, we have that IB > 0 and so bn+1 >
bn. Therefore once bn crosses this value, it will experience monotonic increase for all
remaining rounds. Similarly, the weighted average pB is maximized when an = 1 and
cn = bn, in which case we have











Consequently, the increment in b is IB < 0, and so bn+1 < bn. This brings about
monotonic decrease in bn for all remaining rounds.
The MatLab R© simulations were run for each (q, λ) pair in a 1000× 1000 mesh of
[0, 1]× [0, 1] in the qλ−plane. Each simulation terminated when the value of bn crossed
one of the thresholds or the number of rounds exceeded 1200, and each (q, λ) pair was
assigned two values: a 1 or 0 according to which threshold was crossed, and the round
number n at which the simulation terminated.
The boundary between the two regions in Figure 14 represents the qualitative
change in behavior across the qλ−plane. When we interpolate these boundary points,
we find that
λ(q) ≈ 0.008634q2 + 0.000750q + 0.484524.
This gives us that the critical value of λ where the behavior of the middle site changes









Figure 14: A colormap of the qλ−plane where gray indicates that bn → 0 and white
indicates bn → 1.
even though the critical λ value depends on q, it varies by approximately 2% as q ranges
over [0, 1].
Figure 15 shows that there is a ridge through the qλ−plane that coincides with
the boundary between the two regions in Figure 14. In particular, the contour plot
in Figure 15 demonstrates that as the (q, λ) pairs approach the ridge, the number of
rounds required for termination steadily increases. This indicates that even though q
does not play a significant role in determining the long-term behavior of the middle






















Figure 15: A surface plot (top) and corresponding contour plot (bottom) for the number
of rounds (listed on the right) required for the IPD simulation to terminate.
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9 Conclusion
Having ultimately determined the long-term behavior of the tit-for-tat population in
Site B, we wish to translate these results back into the context of the IPD tournament.
We have shown that for small λ, the tit-for-tat population in the middle site thrives
and eventually pushes the mean population to extinction. On the other hand, when λ
is large, the reverse scenario occurs and tit-for-tat players are driven to extinction.
Having seen that there are no stable nontrivial equilibria in the system, we know that
for any value of λ one population will eventually dominate the middle site, though this
process may take hundreds or thousands of generations.
One way to interpret this behavior is to recall from equation 5 that λ and w have
an inverse relationship, so we see that small values of λ correspond to large values of w,
or in more direct terms, they correspond to longer games between players. This means
that players in the tournament tend to have longer “relationships,” and so players
that cooperate with each other are rewarded for that cooperation over time. tit-for-
tat players form highly rewarding relationships with other tit-for-tat players in the
community, and since these relationships tend to be lengthy, the benefits tit-for-
tat players receive far outweigh the loss they experience when they encounter mean
players.
Another possible interpretation is to note that small λ correspond to a large
growth potential for the tit-for-tat population given the initial conditions. When λ
is small, we see that the tit-for-tat population in Site A has significantly more room
for growth than the mean population in Site C, and so over time Site A will begin to
dominate the effective population for Site B.
The instability of the nontrivial equilibrium represents a strong limitation on the
present model seeing as how real-world communities are in fact stable despite their
diverse demographics. This limitation arises from the simplicity of the single-site game
and the growth model. As soon as one of the population types gains an advantage
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in the single-site tournament, that strategy will grow in size and will see even greater
success in subsequent rounds. For this reason, the equilibrium at λ is unstable due to
the structure of IPD, and this instability is preserved in some sense when the added
complexity of interaction among multiple sites is introduced.
The work presented here has established a core result for understanding the be-
havior of multi-site IPD, but there are many elements of even this simple system that
have yet to be explored. Possible future directions include exploring the effect of the
payoff matrix on the behavior of the system, allowing each site to have different values
of w or q, constructing new initial conditions that do lead to cooperative equilibria,
including additional IPD strategies to the pool of player types, and adding stochastic
elements to the model. Another possibility is to consider other geometries for arrang-
ing the sites, such as a ring or lattice. Understanding these more complex geometries
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